law-stipulation | Rule 11 Agreement | Tex. R. Civ. P. 11
STIPULATION
A stipulation, is "an agreement, admission, or concession made in a judicial proceeding by the parties or their
attorneys respecting some matter incident thereto." Travelers Indem. Co. of Rhode Island v. Starkey, 157 S.W.
3d 899, 904 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2005, pet.denied) (quoting Shepherd v. Ledford, 962 S.W.2d 28, 33 (Tex.1998));
Ortega-Carter v. American Int'l Adjustment Co., 834 S.W.2d 439, 441-42 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1992, writ denied).
To be enforceable, the stipulation must be in writing, signed, and filed as part of the record, or made in open
court and entered of record. Tex. R. Civ. P. 11. Stipulations are binding upon the parties, the trial court, and the
reviewing court. Id. (citing Jim Sowell Const. Co., Inc. v. Dallas Cent. Appraisal Dist., 900 S.W.2d 82, 84 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1995, writ denied)); M.J.R.'s Fare of Dallas, Inc. v. Permit & License Appeal Bd., 823 S.W.2d 327,
330-31 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1991, writ denied).
08-0728
ELIZABETH W. BUFKIN v. EDWARD O. BUFKIN, JR.; from Dallas County; 5th district (05-06-01719-CV, 259
SW3d 343, 07-01-08) 2 petitions, pet. denied Nov. 2008)(prejudgment interest, admissibility of expert testimony,
harm analysis of evidentiary ruling by trial court, divorce fault grounds, prenup, stipulation agreement)
Elizabeth's argument fails for two reasons. First, a stipulation must be an express agreement and cannot arise
by implication from a post-verdict statement in one party's motion to disregard a jury finding. Tex. R. Civ. P. 11
(“...no agreement between attorneys or parties touching any suit pending will be enforced unless it be in writing,
signed and filed with the papers as part of the record...”). Second, even if there was an agreement after trial on
the ranch's value, that agreement would not be construed as an admission of a fact that was controverted at
trial. Austin v. Austin, 603 S.W.2d 204, 207 (Tex. 1980) (stipulation will not be construed as an admission of a
fact intended to be controverted); Hansen v. Acad. Corp., 961 S.W.2d 329, 335 (Tex.App.-Houston[1st Dist.]
1997, pet. denied).
Edward's third issue argues the trial court was wrong to exclude evidence of fault. Edward and Elizabeth both
stipulated to the validity and enforceability of the Agreement. The El Paso court held that once Edward made
this stipulation, he could not then argue it was invalid. Bufkin, 2005 2272522 at *4. Section XI of the Agreement
expressly provides for the division of property in the event of divorce. Specifically, “each party will take, in full
settlement of his or her property and all other rights due upon divorce, only his or her separate property estate
and his or her one-half (½) share of the community property estate of the parties.” The Texas Family Code
authorizes such written agreements. Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §§ 4.001-4.009 (Vernon 2006).
Since Edward and Elizabeth have contracted how the community estate was to be divided in the event of
divorce, provisions of the Texas Family Code allowing evidence of fault See Footnote 4 in divisions do not
apply. The Agreement's terms dictated an even division of the community estate. Accordingly, evidence of fault
is not relevant and the trial judge did not abuse her discretion when she excluded it. We resolve Edward's third
issue against him.
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