law-temporary-orders | TRO | Temporary Restraining Order |
APPELLATE REVIEW OF TEMPORARY ORDERS BY TEXAS SUPREME COURT
In re OAG, No. 08-0165 (Tex. June 27, 2008) (per curiam) (child support collection, TRO void set aside by
mandamus)
IN RE OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL; from Dallas County; 5th district (05-08-00208-CV, ___ SW3d
___, 02-28-08) stay order issued February 29, 2008, lifted
Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52.8(c), without hearing oral argument, the Court conditionally
grants the petition for writ of mandamus.
Per Curiam Opinion
COURT OF APPEALS CASES IN WHICH SUPREME COURT DENIED REVIEW
08-0324
DSTJ, L.L.P., SUCCESSOR TO DSTJ CORPORATION; AND MILESTONE OPERATING, INC. v. M & M
RESOURCES, INC.; ENERGY LAND RESOURCES A/K/A ENERGY LAND RESOURCES LAND SERVICES; A.M.
PHELAN, III; AND DANIEL PHELAN; from Jefferson County; 9th district (09-07-00559-CV, ___ SW3d ___,
03-13-08) (accelerated appeal of an order modifying a temporary injunction, competing claims to ownership of
mineral leases)
The purpose of a temporary injunction is to preserve the status quo of the litigation's subject matter pending a
trial on the merits. Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Tex. 2002). The decision to grant or deny
a temporary injunction lies within the trial court's sound discretion. Id. On appeal, we may not substitute our
judgment for that of the trial court unless the trial court's action was so arbitrary that it exceeded the bounds of
reasonable discretion. Id. Because the trial court did not enter written findings of fact and conclusions of law,
we presume all findings necessary to support the trial court's ruling and affirm if there is any legal theory
supported by the record. Davis v. Huey, 571 S.W.2d 859, 862 (Tex. 1978). The trial court does not abuse its
discretion if some evidence reasonably supports its decision. Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 211 (citing Davis, 571
S.W.2d at 862).
The status quo is the last actual, peaceable, noncontested status which preceded the pending controversy.
Transport Co. of Tex. v. Robertson Transports, Inc., 152 Tex. 551, 261 S.W.2d 549, 553-54 (1953). The
applicant must plead and prove three elements to obtain a temporary injunction: (1) a cause of action against
the defendant; (2) a probable right to the relief sought; and (3) a probable, imminent, and irreparable injury in
the interim. Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 204. The appellees' right to a temporary injunction was resolved in our first
opinion. See Hudson v. Wakefield, 711 S.W.2d 628, 630 (Tex. 1986) (Questions of law decided on appeal to a
court of last resort will govern the case throughout its subsequent stages.); DSTJ, 2006 WL 1360509 at *4. (3)
The issue in this appeal is limited to whether the trial court may enjoin production by the same parties from the
neighboring tract of land.
08-0573
MICHAEL LOU GARRETT v. LARRY E. BERGER, ET AL.; from Wichita County; 2nd district
(02-08-00030-CV, ___ SW3d ___, 06-19-08)(pro se prisoner suit, inmate litigation, temporary injunction
appeal)
To be entitled to a temporary injunction, the applicant must plead a cause of action and show a probable right
to recover on that cause of action and a probable, imminent, and irreparable injury in the interim. Butnaru v.
Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Tex. 2004); Argyle ISD v. Wolf, 234 S.W.3d 229, 236 (Tex. App.CFort
Worth 2007, no pet.); Fox v. Tropical Warehouses, Inc., 121 S.W.3d 853, 857 (Tex. App.CFort Worth 2003, no
pet.). A probable right of recovery is shown by alleging a cause of action and presenting evidence tending to
sustain it. See Argyle ISD, 234 S.W.3d at 236; Fox, 121 S.W.3d at 857. An injury is irreparable if damages
would not adequately compensate the injured party or if they cannot be measured by any certain pecuniary
standard. Fox, 121 S.W.3d at 857; see also Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 204.
The purpose of a temporary injunction is to preserve the status quo until a trial on the merits. See Butnaru, 84
S.W.3d at 204; Walling v. Metcalfe, 863 S.W.2d 56, 58 (Tex. 1993); Fox, 121 S.W.3d at 857. AStatus quo is
defined as >the last, actual, peaceable, noncontested status which preceded the pending controversy.=@
Fox, 121 S.W.3d at 857; Universal Health Servs., Inc. v. Thompson, 24 S.W.3d 570, 577 (Tex. App.CAustin
2000, no pet.) (quoting Transport Co. of Tex. v. Robertson Transports, Inc., 152 Tex. 551, 261 S.W.2d 549,
553-54 (1953)).
In an appeal from an order granting or denying a temporary injunction, the scope of review is restricted to the
validity of the order granting or denying relief. See Walling, 863 S.W.2d at 58; Fox, 121 S.W.3d at 857.
Whether to grant or deny a request for a temporary injunction is within the trial court=s discretion, and we will
not reverse its decision absent an abuse of discretion. See Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 204; Walling, 863 S.W.2d
at 58; Fox, 121 S.W.3d at 857. Accordingly, when reviewing such a decision, we must view the evidence in the
light most favorable to the trial court=s order, indulging every reasonable inference in its favor, and determine
whether the order was so arbitrary that it exceeds the bounds of reasonable discretion. See Fox, 121 S.W.3d
at 857; Thompson, 24 S.W.3d at 576. A trial court does not abuse its discretion if it bases its decision on
conflicting evidence and evidence in the record reasonably supports the trial court=s decision. Davis v. Huey,
571 S.W.2d 859, 862 (Tex. 1978); Fox, 121 S.W.3d at 857.