law-domestication-enforcement-of-foreign-judgment
DOMESTICATION, RECOGNITION, AND ENFORCEMENT
OF FOREIGN JUDGMENT IN TEXAS
PETITIONS DENIED BY THE TEXAS SUPREME COURT
08-0655
DIAMOND OFFSHORE (BERMUDA), LTD. v. SUZANNE ELISABETH HAAKSMAN (AS BENEFICIARY OF
ROBERT DUNCAN BURN QUINN) AND THOMAS JOSEPH MCCARTNEY; from Harris County; 14th district
(14‑06‑00477‑CV, 260 SW3d 476, 04‑24‑08, pet. denied Nov. 2008) (domestication of foreign money
judgment, personal jurisdiction over debtor) (Justice Medina not sitting)
08-0655
DIAMOND OFFSHORE (BERMUDA), LTD. v. SUZANNE ELISABETH HAAKSMAN (AS BENEFICIARY OF
ROBERT DUNCAN BURN QUINN) AND THOMAS JOSEPH MCCARTNEY; from Harris County; 14th district
(14‑06‑00477‑CV, 260 SW3d 476, 04‑24‑08, pet. denied) (domestication of foreign money judgment, personal
jurisdiction over debtor) (Justice Medina not sitting)
07-1039
THE EVEREST GROUP, L.L.C. v. SAMUEL DABNEY WARE; from Dallas County; 5th district
(05-05-01575-CV, 238 SW3d 855, 10-19-07, pet. denied April 2008)(domestication of foreign judgment
reversed)
The Everest Group, L.L.C. (“Everest”) filed an action against Samuel Dabney Ware (“Ware”) to domesticate
and enforce a foreign judgment it owned against Ware. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of
Everest. Ware timely perfected this appeal. In two issues, Ware argues the trial court erred: (1) by granting
Everest's motion for summary judgment, and (2) by applying a post-judgment interest rate of 18% to the
domesticated foreign judgment. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse the trial court's summary judgment
and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
07-0729
JEFFREY WEISS v. JP MORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A. F/K/A MORGAN GUARANTY TRUST COMPANY OF NEW
YORK; from Dallas County; 5th district (05-06-00940-CV, ___ SW3d ___, 07-20-07, pet. denied Jan 2008)
(domestication of foreign judgment, motion for new trial overruled by operation of law, no hearing, diligence)
A motion contesting enforcement of a foreign judgment operates as a motion for new trial. Karstetter v. Voss,
184 S.W.3d 396, 402 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.). When it involves a question of fact, it is also a motion on
which evidence must be heard. See Fluty v. Simmons Co., 835 S.W.2d 664, 668 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, no
writ) (motion for new trial to set aside default judgment is complaint on which evidence must be heard). We will
not disturb a trial court's ruling on a motion for new trial unless the appellant shows the court abused its
discretion. Strackbein v. Prewitt, 671 S.W.2d 37, 38 (Tex.1984); Karstetter, 184 S.W.3d at 402. And when a
motion for new trial requires the exercise of discretion, such as where evidence must be heard, the trial court
must first be given the opportunity to exercise its discretion before the appellate court can review whether it
abused that discretion. See Fluty, 835 S.W.2d at 667-68. To later complain on appeal that the trial court
abused its discretion when it did not grant a motion for new trial to set aside a default judgment, a party must
either present and obtain a hearing on the motion before it is overruled by operation of law or show it used
diligence in attempting to do so. See Fluty, 835 S.W.2d at 668; Capitol State Mortgage Corp. v. Northstar
Mortgage Corp., No. 05-04-01140-CV, 2006 WL 531278, *1 (Tex. App.-Dallas March 6, 2006, no pet.) (mem.
op.). If there is no hearing or diligence in attempting to set a hearing before a motion for new trial is overruled
by operation of law, the trial court does not abuse its discretion by refusing to entertain the motion during the
court's remaining plenary power. See Fluty, 835 S.W.2d at 666; Capitol State Mortgage, 2006 WL 531278, at *1.