law-attorney-discipline-disciplinary-proceedings-disbarment-reinstatement
TEXAS SUPREME COURT CASE(S) INVOLVING ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE
In re Caballero, No. 07-0484 (Tex. Dec. 19, 2008)(Green)(attorney discipline, BODA discretion, disbarment or
suspension when attorney on probation for criminal conduct)
IN THE MATTER OF ROLANDO CABALLERO
The Court affirms the judgment of disbarment.
Justice Green delivered the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Jefferson, Justice Hecht, Justice O'Neill,
Justice Wainwright, Justice Brister, and Justice Johnson joined.
Justice Willett delivered a dissenting opinion, in which Justice Medina joined.
REVIEW DENIED BY THE TEXAS SUPREME COURT
08-0301
ALLEN LANDERMAN v. STATE BAR OF TEXAS; from Collin County; 5th district (05-07-00332-CV, 247 SW3d 426,
03‑05‑08, pet denied Oct 2008) as redrafted
(attorney discipline, disciplinary proceeding, motion for new trial, preservation of error for appellate review)
Appellant had the burden to prove his license to practice law should be reinstated. Because he is challenging the
legal sufficiency of the evidence to support an adverse finding on which he had the burden of proof, he must show
the evidence establishes, as a matter of law, all vital facts in support of the issue. Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.
3d 237, 241 (Tex. 2001) (per curiam); Buckeye Ret. Co. v. Bank of Am., N.A., 239 S.W.3d 394, 399 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 2007, no pet.). In reviewing a legal sufficiency challenge, we must first examine the record for evidence
supporting the finding, then examine the entire record to determine if the contrary proposition is established as a
matter of law. Francis, 46 S.W.3d at 241; Buckeye Ret., 239 S.W.3d at 399. We will sustain the challenge only if the
contrary proposition is conclusively established. Francis, 46 S.W.3d at 241; Buckeye Ret., 239 S.W.3d at 399.
When a party attacks the factual sufficiency of the evidence to support an adverse finding on which he had the
burden of proof, he must demonstrate the adverse finding is against the great weight and preponderance of the
evidence. Francis, 46 S.W.3d at 241; Buckeye Ret., 239 S.W.3d at 399. We must consider and weigh all the
evidence and can set aside the judgment only if the evidence is so weak or if the finding is so against the great
weight and preponderance of the evidence that it is clearly wrong and unjust. Francis, 46 S.W.3d at 241; Buckeye
Ret., 239 S.W.3d at 399.
Part XI of the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure governs the reinstatement to the practice of law of an attorney
who has been disbarred or resigned in lieu of disciplinary action. Tex. R. Disciplinary P. 11.01-.08, reprinted in Tex.
Gov't Code Ann., tit. 2, subtit. G app. A-1 (Vernon 2005). Before the trial court may grant reinstatement, the
petitioner must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the material allegations in the petition are true and
his reinstatement would serve the best interests of the public and profession, as well as the interest of justice. Tex.
R. Disciplinary P. 11.03. In determining whether a petitioner should be reinstated to the practice of law, the trial court
may consider, among any other relevant factors, the nature and degree of misconduct for which the petitioner was
disbarred or resigned and the circumstances attending the offense; the petitioner's understanding of the serious
nature of the acts for which he was disbarred or resigned; the petitioner's conduct during the disciplinary
proceeding; the profit to the petitioner and the hardship to others; the petitioner's attitude toward the administration
of justice and the practice of law; the petitioner's good works and other accomplishments; and any other evidence
relevant to the issues of the petitioner's fitness to practice law and the likelihood the petitioner will not engage in
future misconduct. Tex. R. Disciplinary P. 11.05. The two core issues are whether “'the petitioner is of good moral
character, is fit to practice law, and has led an exemplary life for the preceding five years” and whether
“reinstatement will serve the public's and profession's best interests as well as the ends of justice.” Bd. of Law
Examiners v. Gabriel, 953 S.W.2d 227, 228 (Tex. 1997) (orig. proceeding); see Steinberg v. Comm'n for Lawyer
Discipline, 180 S.W.3d 352, 356 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, no pet.).
Appellant testified he believed it was in the interest of the public and the profession and the ends of justice for him to
be reinstated. Appellant's character witnesses testified they were not aware of anything that would make it contrary
to the interest of the public or the profession or the ends of justice for appellant to be reinstated. However, appellant
also testified as to his conduct that led to his criminal conviction and his resignation of his license to practice law.
Although appellant testified he was not “completely aware” the transactions he was participating in were fraudulent,
he also testified he was aware his client's conduct might violate the criminal laws for seventeen months prior to
terminating the relationship. He was also aware for approximately a year before terminating the relationship that the
client had not changed his conduct even though appellant had advised the client to do so. Appellant chose to
continue the relationship, even with knowledge of his client's conduct, because appellant wanted to grow a
substantial oil and gas practice. The trial court could properly consider appellant's choice in continuing the
relationship with the client after he learned his client was engaged in illegal conduct, appellant's engaging in illegal
activity during the representation, and appellant's motive for continuing the relationship in determining it would not
serve the interest of the public or the profession for appellant to be reinstated.
The trial court also heard evidence regarding appellant's disciplinary history, including a private reprimand, a public
reprimand, and an active suspension from the practice of law due to appellant's neglect of four different clients'
matters. Although appellant argues this history is remote, the suspension occurred within two years of appellant's
conviction in 1993. Appellant has not practiced law since being released from prison. The trial court could properly
consider these three separate disciplinary actions by the Bar in determining it was not in the interest of the public for
appellant to be reinstated.
After reviewing the record, we conclude the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support the judgment. We
also conclude the trial court properly drew correct legal conclusions based on the facts before it. Therefore, we
overrule appellant's second and third issues.
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