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Dismissed and Memorandum Opinion filed May 3,
2007.

In The

Fourteenth
Court of Appeals

____________

NO. 14-06-00874-CV

____________

IN THE
MATTER OF A.M.L., A Juvenile

On Appeal from the County
Court at Law No. 1

Fort
Bend County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 12351

M E M O R
A N D U M   O P I N I O N

Appellant,
a juvenile, was adjudicated delinquent after pleading true to the charge
of burglary of a habitation as alleged in the State=s first
amended petition.  Appellant appeals from a disposition order signed
September 25, 2006, placing him on probation until his eighteenth
birthday.[1]
We dismiss the appeal.

On January
3, 2007, the State submitted a motion for negative termination of the
juvenile=s
probation to the trial court in the presence of the juvenile, his
guardian, guardian ad litem, and a representative of the Fort Bend County
Juvenile Probation Department.  The trial court signed an order
terminating appellant=s
probation, and closing the case.  In addition, the State withdrew its
pending motion to revoke appellant=s
probation.

The State
asserts that this appeal has been rendered moot.  A case becomes moot
when the issues presented are no longer live or the parties lack a legally
cognizable interest in the outcome.  Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S.
478, 481, 102 S.Ct. 1181, 1183 (1982); In the Matter of G.E., ‑‑‑
S.W.3d ‑‑‑, No. 08‑05‑00147‑CV, 2006 WL 2457069 (Tex. App.CEl Paso
Aug.24, 2006, no pet.) (applying rule to a juvenile appeal).  An
appeal from a juvenile disposition order is rendered moot by the
termination of the juvenile=s
probation because there is no live controversy between the parties and
resolution of the appeal would not have any effect on the underlying
case.  Id. at *1.

There are
two exceptions to the mootness doctrine: (1) capable of repetition yet
evading review and (2) collateral consequences.  General Land
Office of the State of Texas v. Oxy U.S.A., Inc., 789 S.W.2d 569, 571
(Tex. 1990).  To invoke the Acapable of
repetition yet evading review@
exception, a plaintiff must prove that: (1) the challenged action was too
short in duration to be litigated fully before the action ceased or
expired; and (2) a reasonable expectation exists that the same complaining
party will be subjected to the same action again. Williams v. Lara,
52 S.W.3d 171, 184 (Tex. 2001).  Given that appellant=s
probation has been terminated and his case closed, there is no reasonable
expectation that he would again be subjected to a modification or
revocation of his probation.  See In re R.M., Jr., ‑‑‑ S.W.3d
‑‑‑, No.
08-06-00008-CV, 2007 WL 896502, *1 (Tex. App.CEl Paso, Mar. 22, 2007, no pet.
h.).  Consequently, the first exception to the mootness doctrine does
not apply.

The
collateral consequences exception pertains to severely prejudicial events,
the effects of which continue to stigmatize individuals long after the
judgment has ceased to operate.  General Land Office, 789
S.W.2d at 571; In the Matter of J.P.D., No. 03‑02‑00425‑CV, 2003 WL
1922466 (Tex. App.CAustin
April 24, 2003, no pet.) (mem. op.).  This exception was applied in
Carrillo v. State, 480 S.W.2d 612, 616‑17 (Tex. 1972), where a
juvenile was discharged from probation while his case was on appeal.
Noting that juvenile adjudications carry deleterious collateral effects
and legal consequences including the stigma attached to being adjudged a
juvenile delinquent, the Supreme Court held that Carrillo=s case was
not moot because Aa minor
should have the right to clear himself by appeal@ and this
right should not disappear when the sentence given is so short that it
expires before the appellate process is completed.  Id. at
617.  An appeal from the disposition order placing appellant on
probation has been rendered moot by the termination of
appellant=s
probation.  While the collateral consequences exception to the
mootness doctrine might apply to an appeal from an adjudication of
delinquency in a juvenile case, appellant has not responded to this
court=s notices
or otherwise expressed a desire to a appeal the adjudication.

Moreover,
appellant entered a plea of true and stipulated to the evidence, and the
court entered a disposition order in accordance with appellant=s
agreement with the State.  The Family Code limits a
juvenile=s right to
appeal under these circumstances.  AA child
who enters a plea or agrees to a stipulation of evidence . . . may not
appeal an order of the juvenile court entered under Section 54.03, 54.04,
or 54.05 if the court makes a disposition in accordance with the agreement
between the state and the child regarding the disposition of the case,
unless: (1) the court gives the child permission to appeal; or (2) the
appeal is based on a matter raised by written motion filed before the
proceeding in which the child entered the plea or agreed to the
stipulation of evidence.@ Tex. Fam. Code Ann. ' 56.01(n).
Compliance with section 56.01(n) has been held to be jurisdictional and
the failure to abide by its terms subjects an appeal to dismissal for want
of jurisdiction.  In the Matter of R.J.D., 2006 WL 3497671, *1
(Tex. App.CSan
Antonio 2006, no pet.) (mem. op.);  In the Matter of B.N.C.,
No. 04‑02‑00788‑CV, 2003 WL 1232997, at *1 (Tex. App.CSan
Antonio 2003, no pet.) (mem. op.);  In the Matter of A.E.E. 89
S.W.3d 250, 254 (Tex. App.CTexarkana
2002, no pet.).

The record
before this court does not reflect that the trial court expressly granted
appellant permission to appeal.  In addition, our record contains no
written motions filed before the juvenile=s
plea.  Therefore, this court lacks jurisdiction to consider the
appeal.

On March 16, 2007, and on April
5, 2007, notification was transmitted to the parties, including
appellant=s appointed counsel, the
guardian ad litem, and appellant=s grandmother, of this
court=s intention to dismiss the
appeal for want of jurisdiction unless appellant filed a response
demonstrating grounds for continuing the appeal.[2]
See Tex. R. App. P.
42.3(a).  No response to the court=s notices has been filed by
appellant or anyone on his behalf.

Accordingly, the appeal is
ordered dismissed.

PER CURIAM

Judgment rendered and Memorandum Opinion filed May
3, 2007.

Panel consists of Chief Justice Hedges and
Justices Hudson and Guzman.

[1]   The record reflects that
appellant=s eighteenth birthday was April 28,
2007.

[2]  A second notice was transmitted to ensure
that appellant=s guardian and the guardian ad litem received
notice of the court=s intention to dismiss the
appeal.