law-severance

A trial court has broad discretion in
consolidating and severing cases, see Tex. R. Civ. P. 41, 174, and we
review such decisions for abuse of that discretion.  Guar. Fed. Sav. Bank v. Horshoe Operating Co., 793 S.W.
2d 652, 658 (Tex. 1990) (op. on reh’g).  

A court may sever part of a case before it is submitted to the trier of fact. Tex. R. Civ.
P. 41
; see Guaranty Fed. Sav. Bank v. Horseshoe Operating Co., 793 S.W.2d 652, 658 (Tex. 1990); see
also State Dep't of Highways & Transp. v. Cotner, 845 S.W.2d 818, 819 (Tex. 1993). The trial court has
broad discretion to sever causes. Horseshoe, 793 S.W.2d at 658.

In their third issue, Cecil Jr. and Jaime argue that the trial court erred in granting the severance that made
the partial summary judgment final and appealable.  Cecil Jr. and Jamie  assert that the trial court abused its
discretion because it severed part of a claim, that the severed part would not be the proper subject of a
lawsuit if independently asserted, and that the severed part is so interwoven with the remaining action as to
involve the same facts and issues.  However, Cecil Jr. and Jaime did not voice this objection to severance in
the trial court.  Therefore, they did not preserve error as to this complaint.[16]  See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a);
Oistad v. Baker & Hostetler, L.L.P., No. 01-05-00493-CV, 2006 WL 488594, at *7 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] Mar. 2, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding appellants waived their complaint that trial court erred in
granting severance by not raising that objection in the trial court).  Accordingly, we overrule the third issue.
Gammill v. Fettner (Tex.App.- Houston [14th Dist.] Jun. 16, 2009)(Frost)
(
probate court district court concurrent jurisdiction, motion for new trial overruled)
AFFIRMED: Opinion by
Justice Kem Frost  

SEVERANCE CASE LAW FROM HOUSTON COURTS OF APPEALS  

Man Industries (INDIA), Ltd. v. Bank of Tokyo (Tex.App.- Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 23, 2010)(Yates)
(
interlocutory appeal from the trial court’s order denying special appearance as to the cross-claim, denial of
special appearance affirmed;
claim not severable)  
We conclude the trial court did not err in denying Man’s special appearance based on its conclusion that the Bank’s cross-
claim is not severable.  Because we have determined that the trial court had personal jurisdiction on this basis, we need not
review Man’s remaining allegations regarding other potential bases for jurisdiction.  We affirm the trial court’s order.
AFFIRMED: Opinion by Justice Brock Yates     
Before Justices Brock Yates, Brown and Boyce    
14-09-00362-CV  Man Industries (INDIA) Ltd. v. Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ, Ltd.   
Appeal from 133rd District Court of Harris County
Trial Court Judge:
Jaclanel McFarland   
In re General Agents Ins. Co. (Tex.App.- Houston [14th Dist.] May 15, 2008)(Substitute opinion by Hedges)
(severance, mandamus granted, TRCP 41, motion to abate)
MOTION OR WRIT GRANTED: Opinion by Chief Justice Hedges  
14-07-00771-CV In Re: General Agents Insurance Company of America
Appeal from 165th District Court of Harris County
Trial Court
Judge: Elizabeth Ray  


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