Palisades Acquisition XVI, LLC v. Chatman
(Tex.App.- Houston [14th Dist.] Jun. 16, 2009)(Frost) (suit to confirm arbitration award under FAA
erroneously dismissed by trial court)(county court jurisdiction)(Harris County county court at law has
jurisdiction to confirm arbitration award, concurrent jurisdiction, preemption not applicable in absence of
conflict between state and federal arbitration act)
Holding: Section 9 of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) does not deprive the trial
court of subject-matter jurisdiction. Because the trial court had jurisdiction to hear
the case, the court erred in dismissing it. Accordingly, the reviewing court sustains
Appellant Palisades's sole issue on appeal, reverses the trial court's judgment, and
remands for further proceedings.
REVERSED AND REMANDED: Opinion by Justice Kem T. Frost
Before Justices Frost, Brown and Boyce
14-08-00108-CV Palisades Acquisition XVI, LLC v. Howard Chatman
Attorney for Appellant: Michael J. Adams
Appeal from County Civil Court at Law No 1 of Harris County
Trial Court Judge: R. Jack Cagle
ALSO SEE: Other Appellate Decisions in Consumer Credit Debt Suits from Houston Courts of Appeals
Reversed and Remanded and Opinion filed June 16, 2009.
Fourteenth Court of Appeals
PALISADES ACQUISITION XVI, LLC, Appellant
HOWARD CHATMAN, Appellee
On Appeal from the County Civil Court at Law Number 1
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 898506
O P I N I O N
This appeal arises from the trial court's dismissal of a suit in which a creditor seeks confirmation of an
arbitration award in a collection dispute. The trial court dismissed the suit, apparently concluding that the
Federal Arbitration Act deprived the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction. On appeal, the creditor
argues the trial court erred in dismissing the suit because the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction.
We reverse and remand.
Appellee Howard Chatman opened a line of credit with appellant Palisades Acquisition XVI, LLC. In
connection with that transaction, the parties agreed to be bound by an arbitration agreement containing
the following language: A
“This arbitration agreement is made pursuant to a transaction involving interstate commerce and shall be
governed by the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§1-16 ('FAA'). Judgment upon any arbitration
award may be entered in any court having jurisdiction."
The parties participated in an arbitration proceeding pursuant to the agreement, and Palisades received
an arbitration award containing the following recitations:
* This matter involves interstate commerce and the Federal Arbitration Act governs this
* The parties' arbitration agreement is valid and enforceable and governs all issues in dispute.
* An award was issued in the amount of $9,203.49 in favor of Palisades and against Chatman.
Palisades initiated this suit by filing an original petition with the Harris County Court at Law Number 1
seeking confirmation and enforcement of the arbitration award. In support of its petition, Palisades
attached to its pleading the arbitration agreement, the arbitration award, and an affidavit in support of
The trial court sua sponte dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. In its findings of fact and conclusions
of law, the trial court determined that (1) Palisades and Chatman entered into a valid and binding
agreement to arbitrate any claims or disputes relating to Chatman's account, (2) pursuant to the parties'
agreement, the National Arbitration Forum conducted an arbitration proceeding and awarded
Palisades $9,203.49 against Chatman; and (3) the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C.§§ 1-16 (“Federal
Act"), governs the arbitration agreement and confirmation of the arbitration award.
Apparently concluding that section 9 of the Federal Act deprived it of subject-matter jurisdiction to confirm
the award, the trial court dismissed the case.
In a single appellate issue, Palisades argues that the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction to confirm
the arbitration award and therefore improperly dismissed the case.
A court must have subject-matter jurisdiction to decide a case. Tex. Ass'n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd.,
852 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Tex. 1993). The determination as to whether jurisdiction exists is a question of
law, which this court reviews de novo. Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 928 (Tex.1998).
A. Does the Federal Act apply?
The Federal Act applies to an arbitration agreement in any contract involving interstate commerce, to the
full extent of the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. See 9 U. S. C. § 2 (1999); Allied-
Bruce Terminix Co. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 277-81, 115 S. Ct. 834, 841-43, 130 L. Ed. 2d 753 (1995);
In re L&L Kempwood Assocs., 9 S.W.3d 125, 127 (Tex. 1999). The parties do not dispute that the
Federal Act applies. When, as in this case, the parties expressly agree that their arbitration agreement
shall be governed by the Federal Act, the parties are not required to establish that the transaction at
issue involves or affects interstate commerce. See In re Choice Homes, Inc., 174 S.W.3d 408, 412 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th] Dist. 2005, orig. proceeding). Therefore, the parties' agreement is governed by the
Federal Act. See id. Nonetheless, by enacting the Federal Act, Congress did not occupy the entire field
of arbitration regulation, and the Federal Act pre-empts state arbitration law only to the extent that the
state law actually conflicts with the Federal Act. See Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford
Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 477, 109 S. Ct. 1248, 1255, 103 L. Ed. 2d 488 (1989); In re D. Wilson Constr.
Co., 196 S.W.3d 774, 789-90 (Tex. 2006). Therefore, Texas law, including the Texas Arbitration Act,
applies to the arbitration, except to the extent that Texas law actually conflicts with the Federal Act. See
In re Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, LLP, 252 S.W.3d 480, 489 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2008,
B. Does section 9 of the Federal Act deprive the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction?
Section 9 of the Federal Act provides in pertinent part:
If the parties in their agreement have agreed that a judgment of the court shall be entered upon the
award made pursuant to the arbitration, and shall specify the court, then at any time within one year after
the award is made any party to the arbitration may apply to the court so specified for an order confirming
the award, and thereupon the court must grant such an order unless the award is vacated, modified, or
corrected as prescribed in sections 10 and 11 of this title. If no court is specified in the agreement of the
parties, then such application may be made to the United States court in and for the district within which
such award was made. 9 U.S.C. § 9 (2009).
The language of the parties' arbitration agreement provides that “[j]udgment upon any arbitration award
may be entered in any court having jurisdiction." Under the unambiguous language of this agreement,
the parties have not specified a court in which a party may seek rendition of judgment on an arbitration
award. In these circumstances, the parties, under section 9 of the Federal Act, may seek confirmation of
an award in a United States court in and for the district within which such award was made. See id; see
also Mauldin v. MBNA Am. Bank, N.A., No. 02-07-00208-CV, 2008 WL 4779614, at *4 (Tex. App.- Fort
Worth Oct. 30, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.). However, Congress used permissive, not mandatory language
in the second sentence of section 9. Under this unambiguous language, a party may seek confirmation
of the arbitration award in federal court but is not required to do so. Indeed, in the Federal Act, including
section 9, Congress did not confer any additional subject-matter jurisdiction on the federal courts. See
Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S.1, 26 n.32, 103 S. Ct. 927, 942 n.32, 74 L.
Ed. 2d 765 (1983). Therefore, even if a party invokes the second sentence of section 9, that party may
seek confirmation of an arbitration award in federal court only if there is an independent basis for federal
jurisdiction. See Specialty Healthcare Mgmt., Inc. v. St. Mary Parish Hosp., 220 F.3d 650, 653 n.5 (5th Cir.
In sum, the Federal Act is enforced by both state and federal courts. See Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp.,
460 U.S. at 25-26 & n.32, 103 S. Ct. at 942 & n.32; see also Mauldin, 2008 WL 4779614, at *5 (overruling
petitioner's claim that the section 9 of the Federal Act limits subject-matter jurisdiction to the federal
courts); Tanox v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, LLP, 105 S.W.3d 244, 247-52 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied) (reviewing state district court's confirmation of arbitration award governed
by Federal Act). Because an independent basis for federal jurisdiction is often missing, enforcement of
the Federal Act is left, in large part, to the state courts. See Moses H. Cone, 460 U.S. at 26 n.32, 103 S.
Ct. at 942 n.32. Under the unambiguous language of section 9, Congress does not confer exclusive
jurisdiction upon federal courts as to arbitration agreements that fail to specify a court in which a party
may seek rendition of judgment on the arbitration award. See 9 U.S.C. § 9; Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp.,
460 U.S. at 25-26 & n.32, 103 S. Ct. at 942 & n.32; Mauldin, 2008 WL 4779614, at *5. Therefore, section
9 does not deprive the county court at law of subject-matter jurisdiction.
C. Does the trial court have subject-matter jurisdiction?
Under the Texas Government Code, “a statutory county court exercising civil jurisdiction concurrent with
the constitutional jurisdiction of the county court has concurrent jurisdiction with the district court in . . .
civil cases in which the matter in controversy exceeds $500 but does not exceed $100,000 . . . as alleged
on the face of the petition." Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 25.0003 (Vernon Supp. 2009). As alleged in this
case, the amount in controversy exceeds $500 but does not exceed $100,000. Though there are specific
limitations in the Texas Government Code concerning the jurisdiction of a Harris County civil court at law,
none of them apply to the case at hand. See id. § 25.0003(b) (prohibiting jurisdiction of a statutory
county court over causes and proceedings concerning roads, bridges, and public highways); id. §
25.1032(a) (Vernon 2004) (prohibiting jurisdiction over probate matters); Transamerica Occidental Life
Ins. Co. v. Rapid Settlements, Ltd., No. 01-07-00137-CV, 2008 WL 5263265, at *2 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] Dec. 18, 2008, no pet.) (providing that a county court at law has subject-matter jurisdiction
when the amount in controversy is within the jurisdictional limits given in sections 25.003 and 25.1032 of
the Texas Government Code).
Therefore, the trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction over this case. See Hoggett v. Zimmerman,
Axelrad, Meyer, Stern and Wise, P.C., 63 S.W.3d 807, 809-11 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no
pet.) (concluding county court at law had jurisdiction over application to confirm arbitration award); see
also Mauldin, 2008 WL 4779614, at *5 (upholding confirmation of an arbitration award by a statutory
county court that had subject-matter jurisdiction). The trial court erred in dismissing it.
Section 9 of the Federal Act does not deprive the trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction. Because the
trial court had jurisdiction to hear the case, the court erred in dismissing it.
Accordingly, we sustain Palisades's sole issue on appeal, reverse the trial court's judgment, and remand
for further proceedings.
/s/ Kem Thompson Frost
Panel consists of Justices Frost, Brown, and Boyce.
 Palisades contends that the Federal Act applies. Chatman did not file an appellate brief in this case,
and it is unclear from the record whether Chatman appeared in the trial court below.