Hon. Doug Warne | Recent Appeals from the 311th Family District Court

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Recent Appeals from cases in Judge Doug Warne's 311th Court

Alexander v. Johnson (pdf) (Tex.App.- Houston [14th Dist.] Jan. 5, 2010)(Hedges)
(denial of bill of review relief affirmed, challenge to paternity, genetic testing)
Appellant, Larry Alexander, appeals from an order denying his petition for bill of review to set aside a default order in a suit
affecting the parent-child relationship (“default SAPCR order”). The default SAPCR order appointed appellant possessory
conservator of J.A., a child, and ordered appellant to pay child support. In two issues, appellant contends that he was
entitled to bill-of-review relief because he was fraudulently induced to sign an acknowledgment of paternity (“AOP”),
preventing him from presenting a meritorious defense to the trial court’s default SAPCR order.
AFFIRMED: Opinion by Chief Justice Hedges
Before Chief Justice Hedges, Justices Seymore and Sullivan
14-08-00778-CV Larry Alexander v. Tiffany Johnson
Appeal from 311th District Court of Harris County

In Interest of JJC (Tex.App. - Houston [14th Dist.] Nov. 17, 2009)(Boyce)(termination of parental rights)
The mother of three children and the father of one of the children appeal the termination of their
respective parental rights. Because we conclude that the trial court did not err in determining that
termination of parental rights is in each child’s best interest, and the parents’ remaining challenges are
waived, we affirm.
AFFIRMED: Opinion by Justice Boyce
Before Justices Anderson and Boyce
14-08-01074-CV In the Interest of J.J.C.
14-08-01091-CV In the Interest of K.J.S.
14-08-01129-CV In the Interest of J.J.R.
Appeal from 311th District Court of Harris County
Trial Judge: Doug C. Warne

In Interest of RCT (Tex.App.- Houston [1st Dist.] Jun. 18, 2009)(Substituted Op. By Frost)
(CHILD SUPPORT CASE: retroactive child support, child support lien, federal tax refund intercept)
AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED: Opinion by Justice Frost
Before Justices Anderson, Hudson and Frost
14-07-00642-CV In the Interest of R.C.T., L.J.T. and C.L.T.
Appeal from 311th District Court of Harris County
Trial Court Judge: Douglas C. Warne

In Interest of BGM (Tex.App.- Houston [1st Dist.] May 7, 2009)(Hanks)(SAPCR, conservatorship)
AFFIRM TC JUDGMENT: Opinion by Justice Hanks
Before Chief Justice Radack, Justices Alcala and Hanks
01-08-00018-CV
In the Interest of B.G.M and B.M.M, Children
Appeal from 311th District Court of Harris County
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Doug Warne

In Interest of RCT, LJT, CLT (Tex.App.- Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 7, 2009)(Orig. op. by Frost)(superseded)
(child support lien by operation of law, definition of arrearage, federal tax intercept)
AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED: Opinion by Justice Frost
Before Justices Anderson, Hudson and Frost
14-07-00642-CV In Interest of R.C.T., L.J.T., C.L.T.
Appeal from 311th District Court of Harris County
Trial Court Judge: Douglas C. Warne

Hernandez v. Hernandez (Tex.App.- Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 26, 2009)(Higley)
(OAG suit, child support, nunc pro tunc judgment vacated)
VACATE TC JUDGMENT AND DISMISS CASE: Opinion by Justice Higley
Before Chief Justice Radack, Justices Keyes and Higley
01-06-00901-CV George Hernandez v. Maria Guadalupe Hernandez
Appeal from 311th District Court of Harris County
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Doug Warne
Dissenting Opinion by Justice Keyes

In re Del Rio (Tex.App.- Houston [1st Dist.] Mar. 26, 2009)(Taft) (no habeas corpus jurisdiction)
DISMISS APPEAL: Opinion by Justice Taft
Before Justices Taft, Bland and Sharp
01-08-00993-CV In re Victor Del Rio
Appeal from 311th District Court of Harris County
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Doug Warne

In Interest of MKM (Tex.App.- Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 19, 2009)(per curiam)
(termination of parental rights, Anders brief)
AFFIRMED: Per Curiam
Before Justices Frost, Brown and Boyce
14-08-00690-CV In the Interest of M.K.M., a child
Appeal from 311th District Court of Harris County
Trial Court Judge: Douglas C. Warne

Hernandez v. Hernandez (Tex.App.- Houston [1st Dist.] Aug 28, 2008)(Higley)
(OAG child support enforcement suit, NPT nunc pro tunc order void)
VACATE TC JUDGMENT AND DISMISS CASE: Opinion by Justice Higley
Before Chief Justice Radack, Justices Keyes and Higley
01-06-00901-CV George Hernandez v. Maria Guadalupe Hernandez
Appeal from 311th District Court of Harris County
Trial Court Judge:        Hon. Doug Warne
Dissenting Opinion by Justice Keyes

Economic Air, S.A. de C. V. v. Jacobs (Tex.App.- Houston [1st Dist.] June 5, 2008)(Bland) (joint motion to
dismiss) DISMISS APPEAL: Opinion by Justice Bland
Before Chief Justice Radack, Justices Jennings and Bland
01-07-00905-CV Economic Air, S.A. de C.V. v. Anita Hall Jacobs
Appeal from 311th District Court of Harris County
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Doug Warne

In re Burk (Tex.App.- Houston [14th Dist.] Apr. 10, 2008)(Seymore) (UCCJEA child custody jurisdiction,
Texas found to be child's home state even though no longer present when SAPCR suit filed; mother
removed child to another state)
MOTION OR WRIT DENIED: Opinion by Justice Seymore
Before Justices Fowler, Frost and Seymore
14-08-00065-CV        In Re: Amy Elizabeth Burk
Appeal from 311th District Court of Harris County
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Douglas C. Warne

DISMISSED: Per Curiam (dismissed by appellant) (March 6, 2008)
Before Justices Fowler, Frost and Seymore
14-07-00997-CV John Brian Dubiski v. Michelle R. Dubiski
Appeal from 311th District Court of Harris County (Judge Doug Warne)

McMichael v. McMichael (Tex.App.- Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 13, 2007)(Jennings) (SAPCR, MTM,
child support increase)
AFFIRM TC JUDGMENT: Opinion by Justice Jennings
Before Justices Nuchia, Jennings and Keyes
01-06-01037-CV Henry Cleburne McMichael, IV v. Jackie McMichael
Appeal from 311th District Court of Harris County (Hon. Doug Warne)

Sheik v. Sheikh (Tex.App.- Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 13, 2007)(Taft)(divorce, receivership, turnover)
REVERSE TC JUDGMENT AND REMAND CASE TO TC FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS: Opinion by
Justice Taft
Before Justices Taft, Hanks and Higley
01-05-01022-CV Wasim Ahmed Sheikh v. Shama Sheikh
Appeal from 311th District Court of Harris County (Hon. Doug Warne)
Appellant, Wasim Ahmed Sheikh, appeals from a turnover-and-receivership order entered after a decree of divorce
dissolving the marriage between himself and appellee, Shama Sheikh . We determine whether the trial court had subject-
matter jurisdiction to enter, or alternatively abused its discretion by entering, a turnover-and-receivership order that had the
effect of enforcing the decree's property division while Wasim's appeal of the underlying divorce decree was pending. We
also determine whether we have jurisdiction, in this appeal, to consider Wasim's challenges to the portion of the order
appointing the receiver as master in chancery. We reverse turnover-and-receivership portions of the order and remand the
cause.

Sheikh v. Sheikh (Tex.App.- Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 1, 2007)(Taft)(divorce, property division, tort
damages)
AFFIRM TC JUDGMENT: Opinion by Justice Taft
Before Justices Taft, Hanks and Higley
01-05-00218-CV Wasim Ahmed Sheikh v. Shama Sheikh
Appeal from 311th District Court of Harris County (Hon. Doug Warne)
Appellant, Wasim Ahmed Sheikh, appeals from a decree of divorce dissolving the marriage between himself and appellee,
Shama Sheikh. That decree divided the parties’ property, made an owelty award to Shama, and also awarded Shama
$330,000 in separate tort damages for assault and fraud on her person by Wasim. We determine whether the trial court
abused its discretion (1) in dividing the marital estate as it did and (2) in awarding tort damages to Shama. We affirm.

De Vries v. De Vries (Tex.App.- Houston [14th Dist.] Nov. 1, 2007)(per curiam)(joint motion to reverse and
remand granted)
REVERSED AND REMANDED: Per Curiam
Before Chief Justice Hedges, Justices Brock Yates and Frost
14-07-00525-CV Liliana De Vries v. Jeroen De Vries
Appeal from 311th District Court of Harris County (Hon. Douglas C. Warne)

Heiskell v. Kendrick (Tex.App.- Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 26, 2007)(Hedges)(SAPCR, grandparent)
AFFIRMED: Opinion by Chief Justice Hedges
Before Chief Justice Hedges, Justices Frost and Guzman
14-06-00972-CV Brian K. Heiskell v. Kennith and Sheri Kendrick
Appeal from 311th District Court of Harris County (name of judge omitted)

Office of the Attorney General of Texas v. Joe V. Phillips (Tex.App.- Houston [1st Dist.] May 31, 2007)
(Hanks)(void judgment, past child support, OAG, AG cases)
REVERSE TC JUDGMENT AND REMAND CASE TO TC FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS: Opinion by
Justice Hanks
Before Justices Nuchia, Hanks and Bland
01-05-00973-CV The Office of the Attorney General of Texas v. Joe V. Phillips
Appeal from 311th District Court of Harris County (Judge Doug Warne)
Because we have concluded that neither the 1986 decree nor the 1992 order is void, we reverse the
judgment confirming arrears at $0 and ordering the Attorney General to return funds levied from Phillips's
bank account. We remand Phillips's motion to confirm child support arrearages to the trial court for further
consideration.

Nowzradan v. Nowzaradan (Tex.App.- Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 8, 2007)(Radack)
(divorce, property division)
AFFIRM TC JUDGMENT: Opinion by Chief Justice Radack
(Before Chief Justice Radack, Justices Jennings and Bland)
01-05-00094-CV        Younan Nowzaradan v. Delores Nowzaradan
Appeal from 311th District Court of Harris County
Trial Court Judge: Hon. Doug Warne

In re Montalvo, No. 01-06-00734-CV (Tex.App.- Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 4, 2007)(per curiam denial of
mandamus)
DENY PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS: Per Curiam
(Before Justices Nuchia, Jennings and Higley)
01-06-00734-CV        In re Jesus Jay Montalvo
Appeal from 311th District Court of Harris County (Doug Warne)

In re Jesus Montalvo, No. 01-06-00965-CV (Tex.App.- Houston [1st Dist.] Jan. 4, 2007)(per curiam denial
of mandamus)(protective order)
DENY PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS: Per Curiam
(Before Justices Nuchia, Jennings and Higley)
01-06-00965-CV        In re Jesus (Jay) Montalvo
Appeal from 311th District Court of Harris County (Hon. Bruce Wettman, visiting judge)

2006 Appeals

In re McMichael (Tex.App.- Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 13, 2006)(per curiam)
[writ of mandamus denied, writ of prohibition denied]
DENY PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS: Per Curiam
Before Justices Jennings, Keyes and Bland
01-06-01119-CV        In re Henry Cleburne McMichael IV
Appeal from 311th District Court of Harris County (Hon. Doug Warne)

Fourteenth Court of Appeals Panel Voids Contempt Order
Bowen v. Kuntz (Tex.App.- Houston [14th Dist.] Sep. 12, 2006)(Hedges)
[family law, divorce attorneys fees dispute, agreement incident to divorce, payment procedure]
AFFIRMED: Opinion by Chief Justice Hedges
Before Chief Justice Hedges, Justices Brock Yates and Guzman
14-05-00769-CV Berry D. Bowen v. Hal G. Kuntz
Appeal from 311th District Court of Harris County (Judge Douglas C. Warne)

Russell v. Russell (Tex.App.- Houston [1st Dist.] Feb.2, 2006)(Nuchia)
[family law, divorce, property division, separate property, value of estate]
REVERSE TC JUDGMENT AND REMAND CASE TO TC FOR
FURTHER PROCEEDINGS: Opinion by Justice Nuchia
Before Justices Nuchia, Jennings and Higley
01-04-00984-CV Roger Russell v. Tamara Russell
Appeal from 311th District Court of Harris County (Hon. Doug Warne)

APPELLATE OPINIONS (full text)

Office of the Attorney General of Texas v. Joe V. Phillips, (Tex.App.- Houston [1st Dist.] May 31,
2007)(Opinion by Justice Hanks)(void judgment, past child support)
REVERSE TC JUDGMENT AND REMAND CASE TO TC FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS: Opinion by
Justice Hanks
Before Justices Nuchia, Hanks and Bland
01-05-00973-CV The Office of the Attorney General of Texas v. Joe V. Phillips
Appeal from 311th District Court of Harris County (Judge Doug Warne)

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This appeal arises out of a dispute over Joe V. Phillips's ("Phillips's") obligation to pay child support in the state of Texas.
Pursuant to a motion filed by Phillips, the trial court declared void both a default divorce decree, ordering Phillips to pay
child support, and an order denying a stay of income withholding. The trial court then found that Phillips owed $0 in child
support arrearages and ordered the Office of the Attorney General of Texas ("the Attorney General") to return the money
levied from Phillips's bank account. In three issues, the Attorney General contends that the trial court erred in (1) granting
Phillips's motion to declare judgments void, (2) confirming Phillips's child support arrearages at $0, and (3) ordering the
Attorney General to return money levied from Phillips's bank account. We reverse and remand.

Background

In 1970, Joe and Mary Ann Phillips ("Mary Ann") were married in Houston, Texas. The couple later relocated to California,
where a child, Aundre, was born to their marriage. Mary Ann returned to Texas, along with Aundre, when the couple stopped
living together as husband and wife in 1977. A second child, Jamail, was allegedly born to Phillips and Mary Ann five years
later. Phillips remained in California.

In 1982, a California court entered an order adjudging Phillips to be the father of Aundre and requiring him to pay $125 per
month in child support. Jamail was expressly excluded from the order because Phillips disputed his paternity. Pursuant to
the California order, Phillips paid child support until Aundre moved in with him eight years after the order was issued.

Mary Ann filed for divorce in Harris County, Texas in 1986. In her petition, Mary Ann alleged that her marriage to Phillips had
become insupportable. She also alleged that both Aundre and Jamail were children of the marriage. Furthermore, while
the petition acknowledged that Phillips was a resident of California, no facts supporting the Harris County court's exercise
of personal jurisdiction over Phillips were alleged. When Phillips failed to appear for the hearing on the petition, the trial
court entered a default divorce decree ("the 1986 decree"). The 1986 decree recited that "the Court having considered the
pleadings, the evidence, the testimony and argument of counsel and being fully advised herein finds that it has jurisdiction
over the parties and of the subject matter of this suit and finds that a divorce should be granted to [Mary Ann] . . . ." The 1986
decree adjudged Phillips to be the father of both children and ordered him to pay $500 per month in child support.

Phillips testified that he never received notice of either the divorce action or the 1986 decree. The return of citation states
that Phillips was personally served in California. According to Phillips, however, it was not until the Attorney General
requested that a writ of income withholding be sent to his California employer in 1991, that he became aware of the 1986
decree's child support order. Using a form motion sent along with the writ of income withholding, Phillips moved to stay
delivery of the writ on grounds that the amount of arrearages alleged was incorrect and that he was not behind in paying
child support because he had complied with the earlier California order, requiring him to pay $125 per month for Aundre. In
November of 1991, when he appeared for a hearing on his motion to stay deliver of the writ, Phillips alleged that he was
advised that the hearing would be reset. He testified that he was never notified of a later hearing date. The trial court issued
a default order in July of 1992 denying his motion to stay ("the 1992 order") and finding a child support arrearage in the
amount of $24,671.50. The 1992 order also required that an additional $240 per month be withheld from Phillips's
paycheck in order to satisfy the arrearage.

Thirteen years later, the Attorney General sent a notice of levy to Phillips's bank. Funds in the amount of $12,555.38 were
levied from his account. In response to the levy, Phillips filed a motion to confirm the amount of his child support arrearage.
The Attorney General filed an answer and countermotion to confirm the arrearage.

Before the trial court ruled on these motions, however, Phillips filed an additional motion to declare judgments void,
arguing that both the 1986 decree and the 1992 order were void. In his motion, Phillips asserted that the 1986 decree was
void because it failed to allege jurisdictional facts and because he had never been served with the petition or received
notice of the 1986 decree. He asserted that the 1992 order was void because he had never received notice of either the
hearing on the motion or the 1992 order itself. After a hearing on the motion to declare judgments void, the trial court ruled
in Phillips's favor and declared both the 1986 decree and the 1992 order void. In addition, the trial court found that Phillips
owed $0 in child support arrearages and ordered the Attorney General to return the funds levied from Phillips's bank
account.

At the request of the Attorney General, the trial court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law. In a single finding of fact,
the trial court found that "Joe V. Phillips owes $0 in child support arrears." In addition, the trial court issued the following
conclusions of law:

1. Joe V. Phillips's Motion to Declare Judgments Void was pled and tried as a collateral attack on the provisions of the 1986
divorce decree relating to paternity and child support and on the 1993 [sic] Order on Motion to Stay.

2. Joe V. Phillips's claims that he was not served with process in the divorce action, that he did not receive notice of the
divorce decree, the hearing on his motion to stay, or of the Order on the Motion to Stay, and that the court had no authority to
enter a default judgment against him on his motion to stay cannot be brought in a collateral attack, but could only be
brought in a bill of review.

3. If the record shows that the defendant is not a Texas resident and long-arm jurisdiction has not been pled, the subject-
matter jurisdiction of a Texas court has not been invoked and the court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to establish the
defendant's paternity of a child or order him to pay child support.

4. The provisions of the 1986 divorce decree relating to paternity and child support are void because Mary Ann Phillips's
divorce petition did not plead facts sufficient to establish long-arm jurisdiction over Joe V. Phillips, whom she alleged to
reside outside Texas.

5. The 1993 [sic] Order on Motion to Stay is void because it is based on the provisions of the 1986 divorce decree finding
paternity and ordering child support, which are void.

6. Because the 1993 [sic] Order on Motion to Stay and the provisions of the divorce decree ordering support are void, Joe V.
Phillips owes $0 in child support arrears as a matter of law.

7. Because Joe V. Phillips owes $0 in child support arrears, the Office of the Attorney General was not entitled to levy his
Wells Fargo account.

8. Because the Office of the Attorney General was not entitled to levy Joe V. Phillips's Wells Fargo account, Joe V. Phillips is
entitled to an order requiring the Office of the Attorney General to return to him the money it had levied.

Motion to Declare Judgments Void

In its first issue, the Attorney General argues that the trial court improperly granted Phillips's motion to declare the 1986
decree and 1992 order void. Specifically, the Attorney General argues that the motion was improperly granted because (1)
Phillips could not collaterally attack a lack of notice in his motion to declare the judgments void and, (2) by generally
appearing, Phillips consented to the trial court's exercise of personal jurisdiction. We agree.

Notice

In his motion, Phillips argued that both the 1986 decree and the 1992 order were void on the grounds that he never
received notice of the divorce action, the 1986 decree, the hearing on his motion to stay, or the 1992 order denying his
motion to stay. A judgment that is void may be collaterally attacked. See Solomon, Lambert, Roth & Assocs., Inc. v. Kidd,
904 S.W.2d 896, 900 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, no writ) ("[A] collateral attack does not seek rendition of a new
judgment to correct the judgment under attack, but merely seeks to show that the original judgment is void . . . ."). A
judgment is void only if the court had no jurisdiction over the parties or property, no jurisdiction over the subject matter, no
jurisdiction to enter the particular judgment, or no capacity to act as a court. Id. All errors other than jurisdictional
deficiencies render a judgment merely voidable, and such errors must be corrected on direct attack. See id.; see also
Plains Growers, Inc. v. Jordan, 519 S.W.2d 633, 637 (Tex. 1974) (lack of notice of hearing or signed judgment do not render
judgment void).

Here, Phillips's motion constituted a collateral attack on the 1986 decree and the 1992 order because it did not seek the
rendition of a new judgment to correct those under attack, but instead sought to show merely that the original decree and
order were void. See Kidd, 904 S.W.2d at 900. Because a lack of notice would not render the 1986 decree or the 1992 order
void, Phillips's assertions that he never received notice of the divorce action, the 1986 divorce decree, the hearing on his
motion to stay, or the 1992 order denying his motion to stay were not properly made in his motion to declare judgments
void. See id.; see also Plains Growers, Inc., 519 S.W.2d at 637. We agree with the trial court's second conclusion of law, in
which the trial court properly recognized that Phillips's complaints about lack of notice could not be asserted as a collateral
attack in his motion to declare judgments void. For this reason, neither the 1986 decree nor the 1992 order could be
declared void for lack of notice.

Personal Jurisdiction

Phillips also challenged the 1986 decree on the grounds that the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction, and, in its
conclusions of law, the trial court stated that the 1986 decree was void because the divorce petition did not plead facts
sufficient to establish long-arm jurisdiction over Phillips, a non-resident of Texas. (1) Because the divorce petition
requested the appointment of a managing and possessory conservator over the Phillips children, as well as child support,
the suit was one affecting the parent-child relationship. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 101.032(a) (Vernon 2002). In a suit
affecting the parent-child relationship, a court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident if "the person submits
to the jurisdiction of this state by consent, by entering a general appearance, or by filing a responsive document having the
effect of waiving any contest to personal jurisdiction . . . ." Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 102.011(b)(2) (Vernon 2002). A party
enters a general appearance whenever it invokes the judgment of the court on any question other than the court's
jurisdiction; if a defendant's act recognizes that an action is properly pending or seeks affirmative action from the court, that
is a general appearance. Moore v. Elektro-Mobil Technik GmbH, 874 S.W.2d 324, 327 (Tex. App.--El Paso 1994, writ
denied).

Here, Phillips filed two motions seeking affirmative action from the trial court before filing his motion to declare the 1986
decree void for want of personal jurisdiction. Specifically, in 1991, Phillips filed a motion to stay delivery of the writ of
withholding, and, in 2005, a motion to confirm child support arrearages. In his motion to confirm arrearages, Phillips
sought affirmative relief from the trial court in the form of a temporary restraining order, sanctions, and attorneys fees.
Because Phillips invoked the judgment of the court on a question other than the court's jurisdiction, he entered a general
appearance. See id. By entering a general appearance, Phillips consented to the trial court's exercise of personal
jurisdiction. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 102.011(b)(2). Because Phillips consented to the trial court's exercise of personal
jurisdiction, we hold that the trial court erred in concluding that the 1986 decree was void because no jurisdictional facts
were pled in the divorce petition.

Because the trial court adjudged that Phillips owed $0 in child support arrears and ordered the Attorney General to return
funds levied from his account as a result of the finding that the 1986 decree and 1992 order were void, the error in granting
Phillips's motion probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.1(a). As such, it is
reversible error. Id.

Accordingly, we sustain the Attorney General's first issue. Judgment on Arrearage and Levied Money

In its second and third issues, the Attorney General argues that (1) the trial court erred in confirming Phillips's arrears at $0
because that finding was based on an incorrect conclusion of law, namely the conclusion that the 1986 decree and the
1992 order were void, as well as legally and factually insufficient evidence, and (2) the trial court erred in ordering the
Attorney General to return levied money based on the same incorrect conclusion of law. We agree.

An erroneous finding of fact or conclusion of law does not mandate that judgment of trial court must be reversed. Lee v.
Lee, 981 S.W.2d 903, 906 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, no pet.). If the judgment is otherwise correct upon the
merits, it is not to be reversed because the trial court grounded it upon incorrect legal reasons. Id. Here, in its sixth and
seventh conclusions of law, the trial court concluded that, "[b]ecause the 1993 [sic] Order on Motion to Stay and the
provisions of the divorce decree ordering support are void, Joe V. Phillips owes $0 in child support arrears as a matter of
law" and "[b]ecause Joe V. Phillips owes $0 in child support arrears, the Office of the Attorney General was not entitled to
levy his Wells Fargo account." That is, the trial court premised its judgment confirming arrears and ordering the return of
levied funds on its conclusion that the 1986 decree and the 1992 order were void, a conclusion we held to be erroneous.
The record does not demonstrate any other basis which would render the trial court's judgment confirming arrears at $0
and ordering the return of levied funds correct. As a result, we hold that the trial court erred in adjudging Phillips's child
support arrears at $0 and in ordering the Attorney General to return the levied funds.

Accordingly, we sustain the Attorney General's second and third issues.

Conclusion

Because we have concluded that neither the 1986 decree nor the 1992 order is void, we reverse the judgment confirming
arrears at $0 and ordering the Attorney General to return funds levied from Phillips's bank account. We remand Phillips's
motion to confirm child support arrearages to the trial court for further consideration.

George C. Hanks, Jr.

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Nuchia, Hanks, and Bland.

Hon. Doug Warne
Family District Court Judge in Harris County, Texas
Houston Opinions

Harris County Family Law Center in Downtown Houston

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